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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HYRUM JENKINS and BELLE ' 
MOYLE JENKINS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and .Appelloots, 
-vs.-
JOHN B. ~fORGAN, WILLIS MOR-
GAN, ALBERT MORGAN, BERT 
MORGAN, ETHEL G. MORGAN, 
1L L. BUXTON and MILO BUR-
RASTON, 





This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Hyrum Jenkins 
and Belle Moyle Jenkins, his wife, from a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the 
sum of $24.00, together with interest thereon at 6% -per 
annum from and after September 2, 1947 and their costs 
in the sum of $ ................ , which judgment is dated J anu-
ary 10, 1952. 
This action was commenced by the plaintiffs filing 
an action against John B. Morgan, Willis Morgan, .. Al~ 
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bert Morgan, Bert Morgan, Ethel G. 1\iorgan, ~f. L. Bux-
ton and Milo Burretson, the latter two being bondsmen 
on a supersedeas bond on appeal in the sum of $1,000, 
bearing date of September 2, 1947, which was in case 
No. 14026 of the Fourth Judicial District Court, or Su-
preme Court, Case No. 7108 .• Judgment in that cause 
'vas entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against de-
fendants for quiet title to certain properties and the 
defendants, except these bondsmen aforesaid, filed a 
notice of appeal and said defendants, including the two 
bondsmen, did on the 3rd day of June, 194 7, file a $300 
cost bond and the defendants did on the 5th day of 
J nne, 194 7, including the bondsmen, did file $100 super-
sedeas bond based on an order fixing the amount of 
undertaking the bond on appeal in an ex parti matter 
before the court on the lOth day of June, 1947. lVIotions 
were duly filed .by the plaintiffs for exception to sureties 
and reconsideration of the amount of bond.- The Ron. 
Joseph E. Nelson did on the 27th day of August, 1947, 
call up for reconsideration on motion of plaintiffs the 
determination of the amount of undertaking of bond on 
appeal based upon the affidavit of plaintiffs that it was 
their desire to have the ground made available to them 
for breaking of the ground and the planting to grain 
which would mature and be harvested in 1948, and that 
the value of said ground was the sum of $20.00 per acre. 
Further that plaintiff had made arrangements for the 
drilling for water on said ground, and that the plaintiffs 
during the period of appeal desired the property for 
agricultural purposes. At this hearing plaintiffs adduced 
f~vidence of the availability of the ground for agrirul-
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tural purposes and the matter w·as continued to Septem-
ber 2, 1947, at 'Yhich time plaintiffs adduced further 
evidence showing the availability for breaking the 160 
acres of ground under question and the drilling for 
'Yater, and on said date the Ron. Joseph E. Nelson did 
order the increase of bond to $1,000; that the defendants, 
including the bondsmen, did then file a new supersedeas 
bond in the sum of $1,000 on the 2nd day of September, 
1947. 
The costs incident to the appeal in case No. 7108 
were paid by the defendants, but no money was paid by 
reason of the withholding of the ground from the plain-
tiffs between September 2, 1947 and August 16, 1948 
when this court did render its decision in case No. 7108, 
affirming the decision rendered by the Ron. Joseph E. 
Nelson. This action was then brought upon the bond of 
the defendants for the value of the use of the withholding 
on the part of the defendants, between September 2, 
1947 and the 9th day of September, 1948, upon "\vhich 
date the remittitur in case No. 7108 was docketed in the 
Fourth District Court. 
Trial in this matter was had. on November 26, 1951 
and December 3, 1951 and the judgment of this court in 
the sum of $24.00 in favor of plaintiff was entered on 
January 10, 1952, from which this appeal is taken. 
The issue involved is whether or not the measure 
of damage of the value for use for the withholding of 
the property by the defendants fron1 the plaintiffs is to 
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be based upon the value of use as grazing ground, which 
is the position which the trial judge took in this matter 
or the value of the use as agricultural ground. 
David S. Powelson, called as a witness for the plain-
tiff, testified that he knew this particular property dur-
ing his lifetime and that his business was that of a 
farmer all his life in and about the Goshen area; that 
he had been on this particular ground involved in the 
years 1946 and 1947 with the intent of purchasing the 
ground from the plaintiffs, and that he did enter into a 
contract with the plaintiffs for the purchase of the same 
on May 17, 1947. (R. 27-28). That this witness did 
receive the 160 acres of ground in question on December 
6, 1948,. in accordance with the agreement entered into 
with the plaintiffs (R. 33) ; that after receiving the 
property he broke the ground in August of 1949 (R. 34); 
that he likewise drilled for water and obtained the same 
and that a crop was planted in the spring of 1950 (R. 36) 
and that a harvest was made in 1950 (R. 36) ; that of 
said harvest approximately 75 or 80 acres was in dry 
land wheat and 30 acres was in irrigated wheat; that 
the 80 acres of dry farm wheat yielded 15 bushels per 
acre and the 30 acres of irrigated grain yielded 40 bushels 
per acre. (R. 37). That during the year 1946, or 1947, 
this witness went onto the property in question with 
Mr. Marcellus Palmer, a land specialist, to determine 
the depth and quality of the soil (R. 38-39). That the 
reasonable rental value of this 160 acres of ground for 
farming purposes was 'vorth $30.00 per acre on the 
irrigable ground (R. 42) and on the non-irrigable ground 
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the reasonable rental value per acre was $10.00 per 
acre. ( R. 42-43). That there was 25 acres of irrigated 
potatoes. (R. 44). 
Hyrum Jenkins called as a witness and identified 
the agreement "l'ith David S. Powelson (Ex. B) (R. 60) 
and then identified a photostatic copy of deed to David 
S. Po,velson and Arnold Dewitt Trotter deeding the 
property in question (Ex.· C.R. 60). 
~Iarcellus Palmer called as witness for plaintiff 
stated his qualifications as an expert and that in August 
of 194·7, he made a detailed examination of the property 
in question. (R. 76). On this examination he made six 
soil tests to a depth of four feet and described the forage 
and vegetation then growing on the land (R. 77). He 
testified that for dry land agriculture a yearly rental 
value per acre would be about $10 per acre and if it 
were nsed for irrigated agriculture about $30.00 per 
acre. ( R; 82). On cross examination he testified that 
rentals are based upon about 50% for the type of crqps, 
wheat, alfalfa, barley or oats. (R. 83). 
David S. Powelson recalled to the stand identified 
Ex. '' E '' an assignment of his interest to the plaintiff. 
(R. 91). On cross examination witness testified that he 
rented comparable land in 1948 and 1949 for $30 per 
acre which land was under irrigation. (R. 93). rrhat the 
ground under question approximately 30 years ago had 
been planted to corn. (R. 95). That the dry farm ground 
'\vas ·broken up in August of 1949 and drilled for water 
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which was obtained in the spring of 1949. (R. 97). That 
. 
grain was planted in the ground dry farm in 1949 and 
the irrigable land planted in the spring of 1950. (R. 98). 
That the cost of producing water per acre is about $2 
per acre. (R. 103) . 
• John B. Morgan, one of the defendants, called as 
witness for plaintiffs, was present in Court on Septem-
ber 2, 1947 in Judge Nelson's Court Room when the 
Judge ordered the bond in this case raised to $1000. (R. 
106-107). And he was present in Court when Mr. Jen-
kins testified that he desired possession of the ground 
for the purpose of having the same broken and drilled 
for 'vater. (R. 113). rrhat he did not remember Mr. 
Monsen testifying as to his agreement to break the 
ground. (R. 114). And that he did recall Mr. Jenkins 
testifying that he desired the use of the ground for 
agricultural purposes. (R. 114-115). 
Willis Morgan, called as witness for plaintiffs, was 
present in c·ourt on August 27, 1947 when Mr. Richard 
Trotter testified that he was ready, willing and able 
under an agreement at that time to break this 160 acres 
of ground. ( R. 117-118) and he likewise had a recollec-
tion of hearing Mr. Jenkins testify at the trial on the 
bond matter. (R. 118). 
· Albert Morgan, a defendant called as a witness for 
the plaintiffs, testified that he had been e~perimenting 
with dry farm wheat on adjacent property planted in 
the fall of 1950 and harvested in 1951 and the ground 
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yielded right near 9 bushel per acre. ( R. 122). That he 
likewise has filed an application for drilling for water 
on said ground and hoped to get 3 or 4 feet of water. 
(R. 123). 
Bert ~!organ, a defendant, called on behalf of plain-
tiffs, remembered being in Court on August 27, 1947 
when 1Ir. Trotter testified to his ability and willingness 
under an agreement to break the ground then known as 
the Jenkins property and was like"rise present on Sep-
tember 2, 1947 when Hyrum Jenkins testified that he 
desired the ground for agricultural purposes. (R. 137). 
Dewitt Trotter, a witness called for plaintiffs, testi-
fied that the ground was first broken in 1949 and that 
it would take approximately 30 days to break and pre-
pare the ground. (R. 150). That Mr. Monsen broke the 
ground with a wheat land plow and the first crop was 
planted in the early spring of 1950. That he planted 
dry land wheat to 80 acres, 47 acres of irrigated wheat 
and 20 acres of potatoes. (R. 154). That from the dry 
farm wheat they received a little over 1200 bushels and 
irrigated wheat 1885 bushels. (R. 155) ~ 
Raymond E. Monson, testifying for plaintiff, stated 
that on September 2, 1947 he was ready, willing and able 
to go on the land in question and break the same. (R. 
161). That between September 9, 1948 and January 1, 
1949 he wa~ tied up on another contract and "ras not 
available with his heavy type of equipment to break this 
ground. That in the months of October, November and 
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December, 1948, the snow came early and hindered him 
in the breaking of ground and that had he been on the 
ground on October 1, 1948, with a snow fall on the same 
he could not have completed the breaking of the ground. 
(R. 163). That 80 acres of the ground broken was of tall 
sage brush, higher than his head and that from his ex-
perience as a farmer the ground broken was adaptable 
and: very fine for wheat. (R. 165). 
A certified copy of the application for drilling for 
water on this ground (Ex. "G") \Vas received. (R. 174). 
David S. Powelson, recalled to the stand, stated that 
he had agreed to lease the property in question from 
O.ctober 1, 1947 to September 1, 1948 to one Ken Tachiki 
for $30 per acre with water on and $10 per acre for the. 
dry farm ground. (R. 246.). 
The defendants called 10 witnesses including the 
defendants as to the value of grazing_ ground in the area. 
At the conclusion of the testimony the defendants 
moved to strike all the testimony of the plaintiffs as to: 
1. Any intended use of the land other than the 
established use to which it was deeme-d put at- the time 
the supersedeas bond was filed. 
2. All testimony of plaintiffs and his witnesses 
touching the question of what had ·been done with this 
property since · the deed "' ... as made from Jenkins to 
Powelson and Trotter on December 6, 1948. 
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3. .AJI testimony· of plaintiffs and his witnesses 
that had to do with special damages. 
4. All testimony pertaining to an oral contract or 
conversation bet,veen Po,velson and the J ap which was 
received as bearing on the rental value or value of the 
use of· the property. 
The Court ruling on said motion overruled the same 
on grou~ds 1 and 3 as stated and granted the motion to 
strike as to grounds 2 and 4. 
The Court at this time gave his oral decision in 
\vhich he stated: 
"The affidavit in support of the motion for an 
increase of bond specifically drew the defendants' 
attention to the fact that the plaintiff had on the 
26th day of February, 1947, made arrangements 
for the breaking of the land concerning which the 
judgment was entered. 
The Court finds that by the filing .of the affi-
davit the defendant had full knowledge of that 
arrangement. The Court finds that because. of 
the supersedeas the plaintiff 'vas deprived of the 
possession of tp.e lanq ... 
The Court finds that a.t that time the land was 
unbroken, uncultivated and undeveloped native 
pasture land and finds that the reasonable rental 
value of that ground was 15c per acre per year 
and. that .there were 160 acres of ground. 
For the use and occupancy of the ground 
within the contemplation of the parties and based 
. upon the ordinary b~si~ of recovery the .plaintiff 
· is entitled ··.to judgment against the. defendants 
and each thereof for the snm of $24.00 . 
. 9 
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The Court further finds that there is insuffi-
cient evidence in this record by which the Court 
could determine any damages to the plaintiff 
specially by reason of the arrangement that had 
been made by the plaintiff prior to the placing of 
the supersedeas bond for the breaking, develop-
ment and cultivation of that ground; and that 
because there is no evidence upon which the Court. 
could measure such damages, special damages are 
denied.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THE l\IEASURE OF DAMAGE ON THE BASIS OF 
·GRAZING GROUND INSTEAD OF AGRICULTURAI_J 
GROUND. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS PERTINENT TO DE-




THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGE ON THE BASIS OF 
GRAZING GROUND INSTEAD OF AGRICULTURAL 
GROUND. 
In Park vs. JJfoorman Mfg. Co., et al., 241 Pac. 2d, 
914, ·--·-- Utah ______ , Justice McDonough at page 920 said: 
10 
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''The fundamental principle of damages is to 
restore the injured party to the position he would 
haYe been in had it not been for the wrong of the 
. other party." 
In Moorhead vs. Jlllinneapolis Seed Co., 165 N. W. 
484, L. R. A. 19180, 391. The Court at page 394, said: 
"The object .of the law is to furnish a measure 
" .. hich will give, as near as may be, actual com-
pensation for the breach, and which is free of un-
certain, contingent, conj·ectural or speculative 
elements. When damages are based upon the 
value of the use of the land the uncertainty of 
amount because of uncertainty of crop results is 
eliminated, and they may be assessed forthwith. 
We are of the opinion that when the failure of 
crop is entire, because of failure of germination, 
the damages should be based on the value of the 
use, with additions and deductions suiting the 
conditions of the particular case. The objection 
suggested by the plaintiffs that there was no fixed 
rental value in North Dakota is without substan-
tial merit. There need be no market rental value. 
It is enough if the use value is determined, and 
that- may be found without the aid of a market 
value. Farmers and others qualified to testify 
may furnish proof of value.'' 
In the case of Pritchard Petroleum Co. vs. Farmers 
Co-op Oil & Supply Co., 190 P. 2d 55, 121 lVIont. 1, Jus-
tice Gibson at page 58 said: 
''The action afforded by the statute is to re-
cover the value of the use of the property for the 
period of its wrongful detention, not exceeding 
the time :fL~ed by the statute. The value of the 
use is the value to the o'vner of the property, not 
11 
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its value to the wrongdoer. Compensation is the 
purpose and basis of the action.'' 
We cite Sed~vick on Damages, 8th Ed., Volume 1, 
Sec. 252, page 376 as follows: 
VALUE FOR A PAR'l'ICULAR USE 
"The value of property is to be estimated with 
reference to the most remunerative use for which 
it is adapted. So in N. J., where the value of a 
horse was in question, Whelpley, C. J. said in 
Farrell vs. Colville, 30 N. J., L. 123, 127, 'They 
were entitled to have the value of the horse as a 
horse to be used in their business, and fitted for 
that use. Perhaps he would not have been worth 
anything as a fast trotter or as a gentleman's 
carriage horse, because not adapted to the work~ 
but that \vould not depreciate his value as a cart 
horse, for which purpose he was to be used'." 
Sedwick on Damages, Vol. 1, 8th Ed., Sec. 253, page 
377: 
POSSIBLE FUTURE USE 
''The present value of property may be en-
hanced by the possibility of making a more re-
munerative use of the property than the present 
use. Such possible use is to be considered. In 
Montana Ry. Co. vs. Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 284 
per Bach J., the Supreme Court of Montana said: 
'The respondent was allowed to prove the value 
of land for town lot purposes. He had the right 
to do so, whether he had built upon it or not. As 
we have seen, the question is not to what use the 
land had been put. The owner has a right to 
obtain the market Yalue of the land, based upon 
its availability for the most valuable purposes 
for which it can be used, whether or not he so 
12 
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used it.' ln ~Iississippi & R. R. Boo1n Co. vs. 
Paterson, 98 U. S. 403, 407, the plaintiff in error 
had taken land of the defendant in error by the 
right of eminent domain, and compensation was 
sought in this action. The jury found that the 
land 'vas worth but $300 for any other than boom 
purposes, but a very much larger sum for such 
purposes, and the Supreme Court of the U. S. 
held that the larger sum should be awarded. 
Field J., said: ''In determining the valu,e of land 
approp-riated for public pu,rposes, the same con-
st~dcrations are to be regarded as in a. sale of 
property between private parties. The inquiry in 
such cases must be what is the property worth in 
the market, viewed not merely with reference to 
the uses to which it is plainly adaptable: that is 
to say, what is it worth from its availability for 
valuable uses? Property is not to be deemed 
worthless because the owner allows it to go to 
waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he 
is unable to put it to any use. Others may be 
able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities 
or conveniences of life. (Italics ours) 
Neu.;ark Coal Co. vs. Upson, 40 Ohio St. Rep. 17. 
In this case Upson acquired 23 acres of ground and 
was developing the property for coal when the Newark 
Coal Company obtained an injunction on the premises. 
This injunctive proceeding was later voluntarily dis-
missed and Upson brought this action. The question 
arose as to what rule should damages be a\\'arded by. 
C. J. Granger at page 25 said: 
''There being no market value of the rights 
taken from Upson and his associates the only 
practical rule for setting its value is to follo\v the 
13 
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ordinary common-sense practice of business men. 
Made known to the body charged with the assess-
ments, as fully as legal evidence can do it, all the 
facts that naturally and materially affect the 
value of the use of the rights of which the plain-
tiffs below were 'vrongfully deprived. These facts 
necessarily include the location, thickness, quan-
tity and value of the coal that was mineable then, 
and then, the facilities for transporting that coal 
to a market; the nature and extent of the demand 
for that coal, the total expense of placing it in 
the market (this included also all preliminary ex-
penditures) ; the competition with which they 
must contend; the contingencies in the demand 
and supply of labor; the relation of the 23 acres 
to other mining lands of Upson and his associates, 
for 'vhich they could use part, or all, of the same 
approaches, the total cost of the coal to them, and 
the prices for which it 'vas saleable during the 
period of suspension; all these facts naturally 
affecting the value of the right to prosecute that 
business with that coal, at and from that place, 
during that time. No one of them is my itself a 
measure of value. Considered together, some of 
them add to, others subtract from the value; and 
then, after such a view, a common sense judgment 
again subtracts a percentage for the contingen-
cies that are ever presenting themselves in the 
affairs of men. 
Within these facts thus stated is the element 
of ''profit'' on possible sales of coal, i.e., the 
difference between the cost of it and its market 
price. But it is there not as a measure of values; 
not in order to be allowed by the jury 'as profits', 
but to be treated as one of a mass of facts that 
throws light upon the value of the use of the 
rights taken from Upson, all of which the jurors 
ought to have known and considered when com-
puting the damages.'' 
14 
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In .A.nderso-n l'S. Coltunb·ia Contract Co., 184 Pae. 
240, 94 Oregon 171. 
This is a case "·here the plaintiff sued to recover 
damages for breaking the fish trap of plaintiff by de-
fendant's tow boat and barges. The question arose as 
to whether or not evidence was proper as to the catch 
of the fish in the trap at the time of the damage and 
whether eYidence of the catch of similar traps during 
the period at which the trap was damaged could be 
adduced, and also was it proper to allow testimony as 
to the amount of the catch after the repair of the trap. 
J. Harris, at page 248 said: 
"While the past success of the trap is not con-
trolling, it is nevertheless one of the factors which 
may be taken into consideration, not as the meas-
ure of damages, but to aid the jury in estimating 
damages. Post v. ~Iunn, 4 N. J. Law, 61, 63, 7 Am. 
Dec. 570; Wood Transfer Co. v. Shelton, 180 Ind. 
273, 101 N.E. 718. See, also, Jacobs v. Cromwell, 
216 Mass. 182, 103 N .E. 383. 
That there was a good run of fish during the 
two weeks is evidenced, the plaintiff says, by the 
fact that the weather conditions were good, by 
the significant circumstances that other traps in 
the same locality, but less favorably situated than 
the Anderson trap, caught each day 'up to a 
couple of tons a day,' and by the important fact 
that, when the Anderson trap 'vas repaired, it 
caught each day from 1600 to 1700 pounds of fish. 
Does not this evidence of the catches made during 
the two weeks, as well as the catches made imme-
diately afterwards, serve to make more certain 
any inference of usuable value that may be dra,vn 
from prior results 'J? Obviously the testimony 
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ab.out the run and catch of fish during the two 
weeks when the trap was out of repair and the 
catches made by the Anderson trap when again 
put ~n repair eonst~tuted data which would be 
very helpful in fixing the usable value of the trap 
for those· two· weeks-. The fishing season is of 
·comparatively short .duration, and consequently 
.: the usuable value o~· the trap might be negligible 
at one time of the year and considerable at an-
·other. In brief, the evidenc.e under discussion was 
competent, not for the purpose of measuring the 
compensation to be paid to the plaintiff, but for 
the purpose of aiding the jury in estimating the 
usable or rental value of the trap.'' 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs contend that the Court 1n rendering its 
oral ·decision on December 4, 1951 recognized the fact 
·that ·the defendants ·w,.ere apprised of the use of the 
ground which plaintiffs desired the same for during the 
p:eriod of appeal. This point is recognized by the state-
ment made by the Court as follows: 
"The Affidavit in support of the motion for an 
increas·e of bond spec~fically drew the defendants 
attention-to the fact that the plaintiff had, on the 
26th day. of February, 1947, made arr~rigements 
for 'the ·breaking of the land concerning ·which the 
judgment was entered. · · 
The Court finds that by the filing of the affi-
davit that the defendants had full knowledge of 
that arrangement.'' 
If the defendants had full knowledge by re-ason of 
the two he~ririgs ·before· Judge· Nelson of the con tern-
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plated use of the land by the plaintiffs as agricultural 
ground then clearly the defendants appreciated that by 
ordering a. supersedeas bond in the sum of $1000.00 they 
had kno\Yledge that Judge Nelson appreciated the con-
templated use as was testified to by plaintiffs' witnesses. 
If the defendants did not contemplate the use by the 
plaintiff of the land for agricultural purposes they had 
a perfect right at the time Judge Nelson ordered the in-
crease on the supersedeas bond to allow the plaintiffs 
to occupy the ground for whatever purpose they desired. 
Otherwise the hearing on the question on the increase 
in the amount of bond \Vas nothing but a futile gesture. 
It is difficult to realize how the plaintiffs during 
the appeal could have made it more clear that they de-
sired to break and cultivate the ground unless they 
forcibly took possession from the defendants. It was 
entirely within the discretion of the defendants to either 
post a supersedeas bond and· withhold possession during 
the period of appeal from the plaintiffs or to surrender 
the property to the plaintiffs and not hazard any ques-
tion of damage between September 2, 1947 and Septem-
ber 9, 1948 which is the date the remittitur from this 
Court was docketed with the Clerk of Utah County and 
is the first time that the plaintiffs were legally entitled 
to enter upon the ground. 
It is contended that the damages to the plaintiffs 
and appellants constituted a loss of the groun~ for agri-
cultural purposes for a period of two y~ars as it "ras 
physically impossible to break the ground until Sep-
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tember 9, 1948 at which time it was impossible to break 
the ground for a 1949 crop. 
Why would the plaintiffs have gone to the trouble 
of filing an application for drilling for water and making 
arrangements with Mr. Monson for breaking the ground 
unless this particular tract was to be used for agricul-
tural purposes. It has never been denied by the defend-
ants that the use to which the plaintiffs desired to put 
the ground was not made known to them at the time the 
increase in the amount of bond was ordered. 
By increasing the bond the defendants knew that 
their liability would be greater due to the intended use 
of the ground for agricultural purposes. Otherwise the 
original bond of $100.00 'vould have been sufficient for 
any damages for the withholding of the ground if it was 
contemplated only as grazing ground. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS PER~riNENT TO DE-
TERMINE THE VALUE OF THE USE OF THE 
GROUND. 
In the case of Anderson vs. Jensen, 265 Pac. 7 45, 71 
Utah 295. This is a case where the plaintiffs were the 
owners of 3¥2 ~iles of frontage of land on Sheep Creek 
on the east side of the creek varying from 80 to 160 
rods in depth. The defendants were the owners of lands 
adjoining plaintiff on the east and the elevation of de-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fendant 's lru1d 'vas higher and more exposed to storms 
and "·inds than that of the plaintiff. That the land of 
the plaintiffs was particularly desirable for lambing 
sheep because it is 'varm, comparatively level and pro-
tected from the spring winds and storms and further 
that it is a distinct advantage to have sheep while lamb-
ing, near "rater. 
Late in April 1926 defendants drove their sheep 
across a part of plaintiffs' land and while so doing a 
number of lambs were born and the lambs and ewes of 
defendant's were left upon plaintiff's land. Plaintiff 
brought his sheep into the vicinity a few days later and 
were unable to occupy their land by reason of the occu-
pancy of the defendants and this action was brought to 
recover damages for depriving plaintiffs of the use of 
their property. J. Hansen, at page 7 46 said : 
''As a general rule, when the owner of prop-
erty is deprived of the use thereof the measure 
of damages is the reasonable rental value of the 
property during the time the owner is wrongfully 
kept out of possession. Such, evidently, was the 
view taken by the trial court. 
It is also contended on behalf of the defend-
ants that proof affecting any enhanced rental 
value of the land in question because of its adapt-
ability for lambing sheep is in the nature of 
special damages and must be specially pleaded to 
admit proof thereof. We are unable to agree 'vith 
that contention. General damages, this court has 
held, 'are the natural and proximate consequence 
of, and are traceable to the act complained of and 
those damages which are probable, traceable to, 
and necessarily result from the injury, * * * and 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may be shown under the general allegation of 
the complaint. Only those damages, which are not 
the probable and necessary result of the injury 
are termed "special" and are required to be 
stated specially in the complaint.' Croco v. Rail-
road, 18 Utah, 311, 54 P. 9,85 44 L.R.A. 285 i North 
Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Canal Co., et al, 23 Utah, 
199, 63 P. 812. Tested by this rule, it follows that 
if the defendants did in fact deprive the plain-
tiffs of the use of their land the probable, trace-
able and necessary result was a damage to the 
plaintiffs to the extent of the reasonable rental 
value thereof. In determining such reasonable 
rental value, the fact that the land may be valu-
able for lambing purposes is as proper a matter 
of inquiry as is the fact that the land may be 
valuable for grazing purposes. The ultimate fact 
to be determined is the reasonable rental value 
of the land, and any f~ct which aids in determin-
ing such ultimate fact is proper evidence under 
the general issue of damages and need not be 
specially pleaded.'' 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that the trial Judge 
was in error in striking all of the testimony of the plain-
tiffs and their witnesses touching the question of what 
had been done with this property since the deed was 
made 'from Jenkins to Powelson and Trotter on De-
eember 6, 1948 and further striking all testimony per-
taining to an oral contract or conversation between 
Powelson and the Jap which was received as bearing on 
the rental value or value of the use of the property. 
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.. A.s 'Yas said in the case of Anderson vs. Columbia 
Contract Company heretofore cited under Point I the 
Oregon Court stated: 
''Obviously the testimony about the run and 
catch of fish during the two \\reeks when the trap 
'vas out of repair and the catches made by the 
.... ~nderson trap when again put into repair con-
stituted data 'Yhich would be very helpful in fixing 
the usable Yalue of the trap for those two weeks.'' 
Ho"T other than showing 'vhat the ground "rould 
yield ~or agricultural purposes could the Court determine 
the usable value of this ground~ The testimony clearly 
sho,vs that 1200 bushels of wheat 'Yere obtained from 
80 acres of dry farm land and 1885 bushels of wheat were 
obtained from 47 acres of irrigated land and that in 
addition there 'vere 20 acres under irrigation planted in 
potatoes. Thus, there would be 80 acres of dry farm 
ground and 67 acres under irrigation and the value of 
this ground as dry farm land was worth $10.00 per acre 
and the irrigated land of 67 acres was worth $30.00 per 
acre thus making a loss to the plaintiffs of a sum of 
$800.00 for dry farm land and $2010.00 for irrigated land 
all in the aggregate sum of $2810.00 for the period from 
September 2, 1947 to September 9, 1948. Likewise there 
was a loss of the ground for the year 1949 which would 
in effect double the above amount which would be a 
substantial loss to the plaintiffs . 
• Just as this Court has stated in the case of Ander-
son vs. Jensen, the damages in this case are the natural 
and proximate consequence of, and are traceable to tbP 
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act complained of and those damages \vhich are probable, 
traceable to and necessarily result from the injury. 
Under the agreement dated May 17, 1947 between 
Powelson and the plaintiffs and appellants it did not 
matter whether Powelson desired to operate the ground 
personally in 1947 or whether he leased the same to ·one 
Ken Tachiki who had agreed with Powelson to pay 
$10.00 per acre for dry farm acreage and $30.00 per 
acre for the irrigated acreage if available in 1947. In 
either event the plaintiffs and appellants would have 
realized a substantial amount as ·consideration for the 
deed. 
To the date of the writing of this brief the plaintiffs 
and appellants have been awarded the sum of $24.00 by 
the judgment of Judge Dunford as consideration for the 
deed passing from the plaintiffs and appellants to Powel-
son and Trotter. 
The agreement between Powelson and Tachiki made 
before the placing of the supersedeas bond distinctly 
shows as an evidentiary fact what the value per acre 
was worth to Tachiki if the property had been available 
in 194 7 for lease purposes. Thus the striking by the 
Court of this testimony eliminates an element "rhich 
should have been considered by the court as the value 
per acre as agricultural ground; at least to the extent 
of $10.00 per acre as dry farm ground even in the· event 
no water was ever obtained. 
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It is respectfully contended that the granting of the 
motion on the part of Judge Dunford eliminated perti-
nent factors which should have been considered in deter-
mining the measure of damage. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the measure of 
damage in this case should have been upon the basis of 
the value of the ground for agricultural purposes. It 
lay entirely within the hands of the defendants and re-
spondents after the hearing before Judge Nelson, when 
the supersedeas bond was increased to $1000.00 to either 
surrender the ground to the plaintiffs and appellants 
such that their arrangement for the breaking of the 
ground and the sowing to crop could have been com-
pleted for a 1948 harvest, or to respond by filing a super-
sedeas bond as they did and to then have the question 
of damage determined by reason of the 'vithholding of 
said ground by the :filing of a supersedeas bond. 
Simply because the ground was unbroken as of Sep-
tember 2, 1947 would not control for an intended use 
which was amply made known to the defendants and 
respondents. 
It is further submitted that the striking of the testi-
mony of plaintiffs and their witnesses concerning the 
use of the ground after September 9, 1948 and the strik-
ing of the testimony of the lease arrangements between 
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Powelson· and Tachiki prior to September 2, 1947 was 
error upon the part of the Court. 
It is respectfully contended that this Court should 
remand this case to the 4th District Court for the assess-
ment of damages on the basis of value as agricultural 
ground. 
,I : ~ •'.!, ' • 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE 
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